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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs/Appellants are police officers employed by the 
City of Allentown ("the City"). The defendants are the City 
and the high-ranking police officers who were involved in 
evaluating plaintiffs for promotion. Plaintiffs brought suit 
under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 and 1985(3), alleging that the 
defendants violated their civil rights by, inter alia, not 
promoting them to sergeant in retaliation for their exercise 
of First Amendment rights, specifically their union activities 
and their support for a particular mayoral candidate. 
Plaintiffs each sought injunctive relief ordering their 
promotion to sergeant and damages. Defendants filed a 
motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims 
for failure to promote, in which they accepted as true all of 
the factual averments in the plaintiffs' complaint, but 
asserted that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law on the basis of an affidavit of William Heydt, mayor of 
Allentown, stating that during the relevant time period, no 
permanent promotions were made. The District Court 
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granted the defendants' motion and this appeal ultimately 
followed.1 
 
I. The Facts 
 
The following facts are taken as true for purposes of our 
review. Throughout 1993, the Queen City Lodge No. 10 of 
the Fraternal Order of Police (the FOP) and the City were 
attempting to negotiate a new collective bargaining 
agreement. All four plaintiffs were members of the FOP 
negotiating team and were significantly involved in union 
leadership, a fact of which defendants were aware. 
Throughout the 1993 contract negotiations, the relationship 
between defendant Stephens, then Chief of Police, and the 
FOP was very strained, culminating in defendant Stephens 
and ten of his Command Staff Officers, including 
defendants Monahan (Assistant Chief of Police), Manescu 
(Captain of Police), Trocolla (a police lieutenant) and Combs 
(another lieutenant), resigning from active FOP 
membership. In late September 1993, one month before the 
commencement of the promotional process at issue here, 
the FOP, having previously rejected five of the City's 
contract proposals during 1993, declared a total impasse 
and elected to pursue arbitration. 
 
In March 1992, plaintiff Suppan requested a transfer 
from steady night patrol. Chief Stephens, in the presence of 
defendants Monahan, and Boyer, Deputy Assistant Chief of 
Police, responded by chastising plaintiff Suppan: "Your 
problem is that you are a frustrated FOP lawyer, and as 
long as you want to assist a bunch of losers with your labor 
knowledge, you'll lose." (A. 97). In May 1993, defendant 
Monahan stated in front of all parties that "The FOP will 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged a campaign of retaliatory harassment that 
resulted in "mental anxiety . . . stress, humiliation, loss of reputation 
and sleeplessness" as well as loss of promotion. (A. 107). Plaintiff James 
Bowser also alleged that he had been demoted in retaliation for his First 
Amendment activity. The defendants moved for a partial summary 
judgment limited to the failure to promote claims only. The District 
Court nevertheless entered summary judgments on all claims of the 
plaintiffs other than plaintiff Bowser's retaliatory demotion claim. That 
claim was ultimately settled and a final order entered. 
 
                                3 
 
 
not dictate how the department will be run." (A. 99). In 
September 1993, one month before the commencement of 
the promotional process at issue here, defendant Stephens 
said to plaintiff Suppan, "I'm getting sick and tired of you 
and your negotiating team trying to run this department. 
You don't run it, I do! You had a career here." (A. 97 
(emphasis added)). 
 
Plaintiffs were also outspoken supporters of then mayoral 
candidate William Heydt. Heydt's opponent, John 
Pressman, was a friend of defendants Stephens, Monahan 
and Manescu. In September 1993, defendant Stephens 
stated, "I have a sweet deal set up when John Pressman 
takes over." (A. 100-01). In late September 1993, the local 
paper ran a story stating that the FOP had endorsed Heydt. 
The paper also reported that plaintiff Dieter had hinted that 
a change of Chief of Police might be in the offing if Heydt 
were elected. Defendant Stephens waged a successful 
campaign to rescind the endorsement. 
 
General Order 309 set forth the criteria and procedure for 
determining eligibility for promotion in the Allentown Police 
Department. All officers with a minimum of five years 
experience were eligible to participate in the evaluation 
process for promotion to sergeant. Officers submitting to 
the evaluation process were then ranked on a "promotion 
eligibility list." Promotion eligibility lists were effective for 
two years. For general positions, the Chief of Police was 
permitted to select any one of the top three candidates on 
the list for promotion, but could pass over a candidate only 
twice before that officer became entitled to the next 
available position. 
 
Plaintiffs, having the requisite five years experience, 
participated in the evaluation process in October 1993. In 
November 1993, they were notified of their rankings on the 
promotion eligibility lists for two potential positions: patrol 
sergeant and investigative sergeant. In accordance with 
General Order 309, these lists were effective from January 
1994 to December 1995. Out of thirty-six names on each 
list, plaintiff Kerrigan ranked highest of all the plaintiffs at 
twenty-eight on both lists. Plaintiff Suppan was thirtieth on 
the patrol sergeant list and thirty-first on the investigative 
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sergeant list; plaintiff Dieter was thirty-third on both lists; 
and plaintiff Bowser was thirty-fourth on both lists. 
 
Candidates for promotion were ranked according to a 
combined score that accounted for two weighted factors: 
20% based on seniority and 80% based on an oral 
interview. Plaintiffs Kerrigan and Suppan were entitled to 
the maximum possible credit for seniority, which was 20 
points. Plaintiffs Dieter and Bowser were entitled to sixteen 
and fourteen seniority points respectively. 
 
The Promotional Interview/Evaluation form allows the 
lowest score to be a four. Defendant Stephens intentionally 
gave plaintiffs Suppan and Dieter less than four on 
numerous items in violation of the rules. Defendant Boyer 
also downgraded plaintiffs, giving scores of less than four. 
Defendants Monahan and Manescu did not violate the 
scoring procedure, but alleged insignificant incidents as a 
basis for their low scores. Plaintiffs had never been 
disciplined or counseled for these incidents. Defendants 
Monahan, Manescu and Mitchell admit that they rated 
plaintiff Kerrigan low because of his actions as President of 
the FOP when he alleged wrongdoing by a police captain. 
Defendant Manescu also has testified that he rated plaintiff 
Dieter low because he got a fellow officer in trouble by 
reporting that the officer struck a suspect on the head with 
a flashlight. 
 
The night before the interviews, defendant Stephens 
telephoned defendant Combs and instructed him what 
grades to give the applicants under his command. Plaintiffs 
Suppan and Bowser were to receive threes and fours. 
Although he did not give threes and fours, defendant 
Combs gave consistently low scores, which he admits did 
not accurately reflect his opinion of plaintiffs' abilities, but 
rather reflected his instructions from defendant Stephens. 
 The candidates who were ranked first and second on 
both Sergeants lists had had severe disciplinary action 
taken against them within the two-year period preceding 
the evaluations, while plaintiffs Suppan, Bowser and Dieter 
have never been disciplined during their entire careers, and 
plaintiff Kerrigan has never been justifiably disciplined. 
Plaintiff Suppan has received many accolades from 
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superiors and above-average personnel evaluations during 
his eleven and one half years on the police force. 
 
In December 1993, before the promotion lists became 
effective, Queen City Lodge No. 10 of the Fraternal Order of 
Police, the bargaining agent for members of the Allentown 
police force, filed an unfair labor practice charge with the 
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) alleging that 
the sergeant's promotion lists were compiled in the midst of 
labor/management negotiations over a new collective 
bargaining agreement and that the rankings assigned to 
members of the union negotiating team reflected anti-union 
discrimination and retaliation.2 In January 1994, while the 
PLRB proceedings were still pending, a new mayor, William 
Heydt, took office. No permanent promotions were made 
during the effective period of the promotion lists. Heydt 
explains that this was in part due to his belief that the 
Allentown Police Department had too many officers in 
management and not enough officers on patrol, and in part 
due to the PLRB proceedings, which made it inadvisable to 
promote from the "tainted" sergeants promotions lists. 
Heydt also believed that the promotion lists were the result 
of unfair evaluations based on nepotism and favoritism 
rather than merit. 
 
II. The Merits Issues 
 
The District Court held that even if plaintiffs' ranks on 
the promotion list were lowered in retaliation for their 
exercise of First Amendment rights, there could be no 
recovery on their failure to promote claim. In the Court's 
view, it is impossible for the plaintiffs to prove that they 
would have been promoted in the absence of the alleged 
retaliation because there is no way to prove, assuming the 
alleged retaliation had not occurred, (1) how many, if any, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although in October 1996 the PLRB found that the City had violated 
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act with regard to plaintiffs Kerrigan 
and Suppan (but not plaintiffs Dieter and Bowser), on appeal to the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, the case was dismissed as moot 
because the promotion lists had expired and no promotions had been 
made from the lists during their effective period. (Brief for defendants 
Daddona et al., Att. 2). 
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promotions would have been made from the list; and (2) 
whether plaintiffs would have ranked high enough to get 
promoted. Because no causal connection can be shown 
between the retaliatory ranking and the absence of 
promotion, the Court held that the plaintiffs have suffered 
no actionable deprivation of rights. 
 
We conclude that summary judgment was 
inappropriately entered against the plaintiffs for two 
independent reasons. First, if the defendants deliberately 
lowered the plaintiffs' scores because of their exercise of 
their First Amendment rights, a constitutional violation 
occurred at that time for which relief may be appropriate 
even if the plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on their failure 
to promote claim. Second, there is evidence in the record 
that could support an award of compensation on plaintiffs' 
failure to promote claim. 
 
III. The Threshold Issue - Collateral Estoppel 
 
Defendants Daddona, Monahan, Boyer, Mitchell and the 
City assert that the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from 
contesting both these issues. As to plaintiffs Kerrigan, 
Dieter and Bowser, this argument is plainly without merit. 
Due process requires that a party against whom collateral 
estoppel is asserted have "some fair relationship with the 
prior litigation relied upon." See Moldovan v. Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 790 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1986). 
None of these three were parties to the prior action to 
which the defendants assign preclusive effect. See Suppan 
v. City of Allentown, No. CIV. A. 97-2102, 1997 WL 476359 
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (hereinafter "Suppan I"). Furthermore, that 
case involved an entirely different set of promotion lists 
than the ones at issue here, and the plaintiff 's cause of 
action was based on alleged retaliatory adoption of a new 
seniority policy that adversely affected the plaintiff, which is 
not the same retaliatory conduct at issue here. See id. at 
*1-2. The mere fact that plaintiffs Kerrigan, Dieter and 
Bowser are now co-plaintiffs with a party to the prior action 
and are represented by the same counsel is not sufficient to 
make them privies to the prior action. 
 
Moreover, even as to plaintiff Suppan, the defendants 
have not met their burden of establishing an identity of 
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issues between the cases. "Identity of the issue is 
established by showing that the same general legal rules 
govern both cases and that the facts of both cases are 
indistinguishable as measured by those rules." 18 Wright et 
al., Federal Practice & Procedure S 4425, at 253 (1981). The 
party seeking to effectuate an estoppel has the burden of 
demonstrating the propriety of its application. See Chisolm 
v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 1981). 
The defendants have relied entirely on the District Court's 
opinion to establish which issues were litigated in the prior 
case. See Suppan I, 1997 WL 476359. That opinion does 
not establish that the Court considered the same issues 
presented here. 
 
As noted, Suppan I involved subsequent promotion lists 
and different acts of alleged retaliation on the part of the 
defendants. Moreover, the Suppan I Court considered 
whether a change in the seniority policy that resulted in the 
plaintiff 's low ranking could by itself support a First 
Amendment retaliation claim. See id. That issue is not 
before us. In the instant case, what we must decide is 
whether a campaign of harassment, including threatening 
statements and culminating in a retaliatory low ranking 
that purports to be based on an assessment of the 
plaintiffs' qualifications, and that results in"mental 
anxiety, . . . stress, humiliation, loss of reputation, and 
sleeplessness," is an actionable First Amendment violation. 
(A. 107). The injuries that result from a low-ranking based 
on lack of seniority and a low-ranking based on 
qualifications are not "indistinguishable" in the context of 
First Amendment retaliation. For example, there is no 
indication in the Suppan I opinion that the plaintiff there 
had suffered humiliation and loss of reputation as a result 
of his low-ranking. Moreover, a low-ranking on the list "by 
itself " is distinguishable from a series of retaliatory 
incidents including threats and culminating in a low- 
ranking. Given that it is generally a question of fact 
whether a retaliatory campaign of harassment has reached 
the threshold of actionability under S 1983, see Bart v. 
Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982), we cannot say 
that these differences are legally insignificant. 
 
Suppan I also determined that the plaintiff 's claim for 
retaliatory failure to promote was not ripe for decision 
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where, for reasons having nothing to do with the plaintiff 's 
protected conduct or the defendants' alleged retaliation (i.e., 
the plaintiff's poor performance on an objective exam), the 
plaintiff would not be eligible for promotion until eighteen 
promotions had been made. See Suppan I, 1997 WL 
476359, at *5-8. Put differently, the issue in Suppan I was 
whether the plaintiff 's failure to promote claim was viable 
in light of undisputed evidence of an intervening and 
superceding cause for the plaintiff 's not having been 
promoted. In contrast, the second issue presented in the 
instant case is whether the plaintiffs have viable failure to 
promote claims where there is evidence that the plaintiffs' 
protected conduct and the defendants' retaliation were 
substantial factors in each step of the decision-making 
process, and where therefore there was no independent and 
superceding cause. Therefore, because the instant case 
involves different legal issues that arise in a different 
factual context, none of the plaintiffs claims are collaterally 
estopped. 
 
IV. The Violation 
 
Because the plaintiffs were unable to prove that they 
would have been promoted in the absence of the retaliatory 
low ranking, this left them, in the District Court's view, 
"with only the argument that their low rankings .. . alone 
can support a S 1983 claim for retaliation if they can prove 
that the rankings resulted from defendants' alleged bias 
against them for engaging in protected conduct." Suppan v. 
Daddona, No. CIV. A. 95-5181, 1996 WL 592644, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1996). The District Court concluded that 
this claim was "too insubstantial to support the deprivation 
of rights element of a S 1983 claim."3 Id. We disagree. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court cited Ferraro v. City of Long Branch, 23 F.3d 803 
(3d Cir. 1994), as supporting this conclusion. See Suppan, 1996 WL 
592644, at * 8. It is inapposite. Ferraro was not a First Amendment 
retaliation case; it addressed whether an adverse change in working 
conditions deprived an employee of a property interest in employment in 
violation of the due process clause. See Ferraro, 23 F.3d at 804. Because 
the plaintiff conceded that he had not been deprived of his job or 
suffered any loss of pay or benefits, the court concluded he had not been 
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In Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), the 
Supreme Court held "that promotions, transfers, and 
recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support 
are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment 
rights of public employees." Id. at 75. In the course of its 
opinion, the Court rejected the argument that the First 
Amendment rights of the public employees had "not been 
infringed because they [had] no entitlement to promotion, 
transfer, or rehire." Id. at 72. Relying on Perry v. 
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)(teacher's lack of 
contractual or tenure rights to reemployment is immaterial 
to his First Amendment claim), the Court found the lack of 
legal entitlement "beside the point" in a First Amendment 
case. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 72. 
 
The Court then turned to the argument that the 
employee's First Amendment rights were not violated 
because the retaliatory decisions did "not in any way 
adversely affect the terms of employment, and therefore 
[did] not chill the exercise of protected belief and 
association." Id. at 73. The Court responded: 
 
       This is not credible. Employees who find themselves in 
       dead-end positions due to their political backgrounds 
       are adversely affected. They will feel a significant 
       obligation to support political positions held by their 
       superiors, and to refrain from acting on the political 
       views they actually hold, in order to progress up the 




The Supreme Court went on to observe that "the First 
Amendment . . . protects state employees not only from 
patronage dismissals but also from `even an act of 
retaliation as trivial as failing to hold a birthday party for a 
public employee . . . when intended to punish her for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
deprived of a property interest that could support aS 1983 claim based 
on the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 806-07. Similarly, the district 
courts' reliance on Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 
1995), is equally misplaced. The Mark plaintiff's S 1983 action was based 
on alleged violations of substantive due process; it was not a retaliation 
case. See Mark, 51 F.3d at 1141. 
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exercising her free speech rights.' " Id. at 76 n. 8 (quoting 
Rutan v. Republican Party, 868 F.2d 943, 954 n. 4 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 
Under the teachings of Rutan, we believe that a trier of 
fact could determine that a violation of the First 
Amendment occurred at the time of the rankings on the 
promotion list and that some relief is appropriate even if 
plaintiffs cannot prove a causal connection between the 
rankings and the failure to promote. The plaintiffs' 
complaint alleges a campaign of retaliatory harassment 
culminating in the retaliatory rankings and asserts that the 
defendants' conduct resulted in "mental anxiety, . . . stress, 
humiliation, loss of reputation, and sleeplessness" as well 
as loss of promotion. (A. at 107). Accepting as true the facts 
alleged in the complaint, as the District Court was required 
to do in light of defendants' stipulation, the District Court 
erred in concluding that there has been no actionable First 
Amendment violation for which relief would be appropriate. 
 
We find the observation of the Court in Bart v. Telford, 
677 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982) appropriate here. The plaintiff 
there had allegedly been the victim of a "campaign of petty 
harassments . . . motivated by her [political] views," a 
retaliation less serious in our view than the one alleged 
here. Id. at 625. In remanding for a trial on the merits, the 
Bart Court observed: 
 
       The effect on freedom of speech may be small, but 
       since there is no justification for harassing people for 
       exercising their constitutional rights it need not be 
       great in order to be actionable. Yet even in thefield of 
       constitutional torts de minimis non curat lex. Section 
       1983 is a tort statute. A tort to be actionable requires 
       injury. It would trivialize the First Amendment to hold 
       that harassment for exercising the right of free speech 
       was always actionable no matter how unlikely to deter 
       a person of ordinary firmness from that exercise-- that 
       if the Mayor of Springfield had frowned at Miss Bart for 
       running for public office he would be liable for 
       damages (unprovable, of course) under section 1983. 
       See Raymon v. Alvord Indep. Sch. Dist., 639 F.2d 257 
       (5th Cir. 1981); cf. Walsh v. Louisiana High School 
       Athletic Ass'n, 616 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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       However, more is alleged here -- an entire campaign of 
       harassment which though trivial in detail may have 
       been substantial in gross. It is a question of fact 
       whether the campaign reached the threshold of 




Similarly, we conclude that a factfinder in this case could 
determine that the alleged retaliatory conduct was sufficient 
"to deter a person of ordinary firmness" from exercising his 
First Amendment rights and that some relief may be 
appropriate. 
 
V. Causation and the Extent of Relief 
 
If the trier of fact determines that a violation of the 
plaintiffs' First Amendment rights occurred at the time the 
promotion list was prepared, the plaintiffs are entitled to 
relief with respect to any injury or loss that resulted. This 
should include relief with respect to the loss of promotions 
if the requisite causal connection is shown. We believe the 
District Court's conclusion that it is impossible to establish 
the requisite causation overlooked relevant record evidence 
and misallocated the burden of proof. 
 
In a First Amendment retaliation case, the plaintiff has 
the initial burden of showing that his constitutionally 
protected conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating factor" 
in the relevant decision. Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 
(citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 & n.21 (1977)). 
Once the plaintiff carries this burden, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to show "by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have reached the same decision even in the 
absence of the protected conduct." Id. In adopting this 
framework, the Mount Healthy Court explained the 
rationale for providing the employer with the opportunity to 
prove it would have reached the same decision in the 
absence of retaliation: 
 
       [a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether 
       protected conduct played a part, "substantial" or 
       otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an 
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       employee in a better position as a result of the exercise 
       of constitutionally protected conduct than he would 
       have occupied had he done nothing. . . . The 
       constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated 
       if such employee is placed in no worse a position than 
       if he had not engaged in the conduct. 
 
Id. at 285 (emphasis added). 
 
Mount Healthy does not define "substantial" or 
"motivating factor." It does, however, attribute the phrase 
"motivating factor" to Village of Arlington Heights, which, in 
the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, 
discussed the challengers' burden of proving discriminatory 
purpose. Id. at 287 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights, 
429 U.S. at 270-71 & n.21). The Arlington Heights plaintiffs 
relied entirely on evidence of disparate impact; they 
adduced no other evidence of discriminatory purpose. See 
Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268-70. The Court 
stressed that the plaintiffs were not required to show that 
a decision was "motivated solely by a single concern, or 
even that a particular purpose was the `dominant' or 
`primary' one." Id. at 265. The Court held, however, that the 
plaintiffs' evidence of discriminatory effect was insufficient 
"to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory 
purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision." 
Id. at 270. In the course of reaching this conclusion, the 
Court further noted that: 
 
       [p]roof that the decision was motivated in part by a 
       racially discriminatory purpose would not necessarily 
       have required invalidation of the challenged decision. 
       Such proof would, however, have shifted to the Village 
       the burden of establishing that the same decision 
       would have resulted even had the impermissible 
       purpose not been considered. 
 
Id. at 270 n.21. 
 
Under Mount Healthy's burden-shifting substantial- 
factor/same-decision framework, the plaintiff is not 
required to prove "but for" cause in order to warrant a 
judgment in his favor. In this framework, the defendants, in 
proving "same decision," must prove that the protected 
conduct was not the but-for cause. If, in proving a 
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substantial or motivating factor, plaintiffs were required to 
prove but-for causation, it would be impossible for 
defendants to then prove that the same decision would 
have been made in the absence of what the plaintiffs had 
already shown to be the but-for cause of the decision. While 
but-for causation is the ultimate question, it is the 
defendants' burden to prove lack of but-for causation. 
 
Thus, under Mount Healthy, if a plaintiff establishes that 
the exercise of his First Amendment rights played some 
substantial role in the relevant decision, he is entitled to 
the extent practicable to be put in the same position that 
he would have been in had he not engaged in that 
protected conduct. As a result, if the defendant is able to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that the same 
decision would have been made had the protected conduct 
not played a substantial role, no relief will be required. On 
the other hand, if the protected conduct played any 
substantial role and the defendant is unable to carry its 
burden of showing the plaintiff has suffered no adverse 
consequences as a result, the plaintiff is entitled to be put 
in the same position he would have been in had the tainted 
decision been made in his favor. 
 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs 
engaged in protected conduct, that they were qualified to 
participate in the promotion process, and that they were 
not promoted. The plaintiffs have the burden of showing by 
a preponderance of the evidence that their protected 
activity played a substantial role in the two decisions that 
resulted in their not being promoted: the ranking decision 
and the decision not to promote anyone. If the plaintiffs 
carry that burden, the burden will shift to the defendants 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
plaintiffs would have gone unpromoted even if they had not 
engaged in the protected activity. That burden could be 
carried by showing that: 
 
(1) a fair evaluation by their superiors -- i.e., one in 
which retaliation played no role, would have ranked the 
plaintiffs sufficiently low on the list that they would not be 
contenders for any promotions that would be made; or 
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(2) a fair evaluation by those supervisors would h ave 
resulted in the same decision by the mayor not to promote 
anyone; or 
 
(3) assuming promotions would have been made, a fa ir 
evaluation by those supervisors would have resulted in the 
Police Chief 's selecting other contenders.4 
 
Since we are reviewing the District Court's decision on a 
defense motion for partial summary judgment, the crucial 
issues for us at this stage are whether the plaintiffs came 
forward with sufficient evidence so that a trier of fact could 
find that plaintiffs' protected conduct played a substantial 
role in the two decisions that resulted in their not being 
promoted. We hold that they have. 
 
For purposes of this motion for summary judgment, 
defendants accepted as true all the factual averments in 
plaintiffs' complaint. It is clear that these facts could lead 
a reasonable factfinder to conclude not only that 
defendants were biased against the plaintiffs because of 
their protected activities, but that they acted on that bias in 
the evaluation process, lowering plaintiffs' scores. There are 
statements by the decisionmakers reflecting hostility to 
plaintiffs' union activities, particularly the statement by 
defendant Stephens made to plaintiff Suppan one month 
prior to the evaluations to the effect that because of 
his union activities, he had (past tense) a career 
with the department. Most importantly, several of the 
decisionmakers admit that the plaintiffs' protected conduct 
caused them to lower their scores. This evidence, if 
credited, is sufficient to prove that plaintiffs' protected 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Defendants would demonstrate this third alternative by showing that 
even if absent retaliation the plaintiffs would have ranked high enough 
to be twice considered for promotion, the Police Chief would have 
exercised his option to pass over a top-ranked candidate twice. We 
emphasize again, however, that this is the defendants' burden to show 
that the same decision would have been made even absent retaliation; 
the Police Chief 's hypothetical decision plays no part in the plaintiff 
's 
 
prima facie case. The plaintiffs' case is based on the actual decisions 
that led to their not being promoted; they are not required to adduce 
evidence that their protected conduct would have been a substantial or 
motivating factor in a hypothetical decision that in fact was never made. 
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conduct was a substantial factor in the ranking decision, 
thus shifting the burden to the defendants. 
 
The affidavit of Mayor William Heydt is direct evidence 
from the decisionmaker regarding the reasons for the 
decision not to make any promotions. He swears that one 
of the factors in his decision was the claim brought on 
behalf of the plaintiffs alleging retaliation for their protected 
union activities. Plaintiffs' protected conduct was the basis 
and but-for cause of the PLRB proceedings. Indeed, the 
unfair labor practice charge and the PLRB proceedings are 
themselves protected activities. Given that the plaintiffs' 
protected conduct and the defendants' retaliatory acts 
caused both the PLRB proceedings and the "taint" in the 
lists, and that these in turn were substantial factors in the 
decision not to make promotions, the plaintiffs' burden with 
respect to causation has been met. 
 
It is true, as the defendants stress, that there is no 
evidence of any retaliatory animus underlying the Mayor's 
decision not to make any promotions. Rather, the logical 
inference is that the Mayor was motivated by fear of liability.5 
Further, there is nothing to suggest that the Mayor's 
decision was in any way improper. Indeed, had the Mayor 
made promotions from the lists, he might have subjected 
the municipality to S 1983 liability by exhibiting deliberate 
indifference to plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. See San 
Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1994). 
This does not, however, negate the retaliatory animus 
behind the initial ranking decision, and so it cannot 
expunge the taint from the process. Nor does it break the 
causal connection between plaintiffs' protected conduct and 
the defendants' failure to promote them. 
 
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment 
on plaintiffs' failure to promote claims. Plaintiffs adduced 
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude 
that plaintiffs' protected conduct was a substantial factor in 
both the ranking decision and the decision not to promote 
anyone, and thus the burden shifted to the defendants to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Since Mayor Heydt is the candidate whom plaintiffs supported, a 
factfinder might also conclude the Mayor was acting to protect plaintiffs' 
interests. 
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show that the plaintiffs are in the same position they would 
have been in if they had not engaged in protected activity. 
If it turns out to be true, as the District Court predicted, 
that it is impossible to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence what would have happened absent the retaliation, 
it is the defendants who will bear that risk once the 
plaintiffs have established that retaliation was a substantial 




The judgment of the District Court will be reversed, and 
this matter will be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1997), is distinguishable. 
In that suit, which was brought by the officers at the top of these same 
lists, this Court found that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of 
proving causation. See id. at 182. However, the protected conduct upon 
which those plaintiffs based their claims was not the basis for the unfair 
labor practice charge that was at issue in the PLRB proceedings. The 
Stephens plaintiffs had presented no direct evidence that their own 
protected conduct or the defendants' retaliation against them played any 
part in the decision not to make promotions. This Court concluded that 
no reasonable jury could have found that Heydt's proffered reasons for 
failure to promote anyone from the list, the unfair labor practice charge 
and the taint in the lists, were a pretextual cover for an impermissible 
decision based on the plaintiffs' protected activity. See id. at 181-82. 
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